given rather than constituted in and by power relations. Certainly, many if not all of these leaders try to project an image of personal power, to establish a more hereditary form of rule, and/or to reward their loyal clients; hence, a focus on patronage relations rather than impersonal institutions might be more fruitful.
2 Patronage relations, however, are generally characterized as illegitimate, informal, and non-institutionalized; but in Iraqi Kurdistan, they have become so pervasive and so deeply entrenched that one may ask to what extent dichotomies like formalinformal and institutional as opposed to personal can still be unproblematically applied here.
Instead, I will attempt here to analyse developments in the region in terms of spaces rather than institutions, and in terms of powers and strategies rather than persons or intentions. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for doing so. Possibly starting with Henri Lefebvre's famous 1974 study, the insight that space is not physically given but social (and linguistically) produced, and in its turn shapes and constrains thoughts and actions, has helped to counter overly time-saturated social-scientific narratives of progress and modernization. 3 More recently, in The Nation State and Violence, the second volume of his critique of historical materialism, British sociologist Anthony Giddens stresses the importance of space for the theory of power. Some spaces, he argues, form 'power containers', i.e., circumscribed areas for the generation of administrative power and for the concentration of resources. Next to, and even more than, institutions like schools, hospitals, and prisons, he claims, the pre-eminent such modern power container is the territorially bounded nation state. 4 Clearly, frontiers or boundaries are crucial to these particular power containers: it is only within its borders that a state is, or is held to be, sovereign; and it can amass or concentrate resources either by controlling or taxing the production of goods on its territory or by restricting, encouraging, or -again -taxing the transport of goods across its borders. Clearly, however, Giddens still emphasizes the role and importance of institutions, most importantly, the (nation) state; in part, this emphasis results from his self-consciously ethnocentric focus on states in (Western) Europe. (Collins 1988) and the older but still useful collection edited by E. Gellner & J. Waterbury, Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (Duckworth 1980) . For a more recent discussion, see e.g. Matthew Flinders, 'Governance and Patronage,' in David Levi-Faur (ed.) , The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press 2012) . 3 Henri Lefebvre, La production de l'espace (Anthropos 1974) . 4 Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 2 (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press 1987), p. 13. Giddens prefers the term locale over space or place, as it may account for the coordination of time as well as space; but I will ignore this point here.
5 Giddens (1987: 5) .
Famously, a number of these institutionalist assumptions and conceptions have been explicated and criticized by the Frenchman Michel Foucault. The seemingly consensual and peaceful character of institutions, Foucault argues, masks an never-ending struggle between different forms of domination and resistance; instead, Foucault proposes to study practices and strategies rather than rules or institutions. 6 Next to the consensus-theoretical bias of institutional analyses, Foucault also criticizes the concomitant assumption of power as sovereignty, that is, as exercised by the state or the ruler and in the form or guise of laws: for him, there are also nonsovereign modalities of power, like, most famously, discipline, which is not exercised by the state (the unity and individuality of which he sees as a 'mythified abstraction' anyway); 7 rather, it functions in separate institutions or spaces, like hospitals, schools and prisons, and in the guise of a normal-pathological rather than a law-transgression distinction. Moreover, according to Foucault, power relations do not simply, or necessarily, distort or repress social realities independently and antecedently given; rather, they may themselves produce such realities.
8
Foucault's genealogical analyses specifically thematize questions of space: a temporal vocabulary, he argues, including that of dialectics, models discourse on individual consciousness and sees change as continuous; but a spatial vocabulary calls attention to discontinuities and to relations of power (DE III: 33 
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In the early 1990s, however, a novel spatial if not territorial entity emerged in Northern Iraq. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, part of the 'Autonomous Region' unilaterally established by the Baath regime in 1974 came under the control of a coalition of Kurdish parties or guerrilla movements. From then on, the Kurds were able to create a political space that was de facto though not de jure largely autonomous from Baghdad, but by no means entirely sealed off from it. The region, however, was less a quasi-sovereign territory than an arena for intra-Kurdish struggles. In 1992, the parties united in the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) organized regional elections, which yielded a 50-50 division of seats between the two biggest parties, the Kurdistan August 1996, the fights ended with an American-brokered peace agreement in 1998. In the process, both parliament and the civilian government had been effectively sidelined. The mandates of both had expired in 1996 anyway, but no new regional elections were to be held until 2005.
Economically, too, the region was hardly a power container in Giddens's sense, at the very least until the initiation of the UN-led Oil For Food program brought some relief (though no structural improvement) in 1998. Local agriculture had been destroyed by the Iraqi regime's policies and by developments in the international market; and since late 1991, the region suffered under a blockade imposed by Baghdad in addition to the UN sanctions against Iraq as a whole. In the dire economic circumstances, smuggling became one of the main incomegenerating activities. Most importantly, this involved petrol products from government-held Iraq into Turkey, but it also included cigarettes; and, with ever larger numbers of people wanting to escape the harsh regional conditions, human trafficking became increasingly lucrative, with people paying thousands of dollars for exit visas and the services of smuggling rings. In the circumstances, one might argue, the region's borders or front lines were less the demarcations of sovereign territories or warrants of territorial integrity than opportunities or instruments for increasing profits.
As a result of the infighting, the de facto autonomous region remained even more vulnerable not only to economic and military interference from Baghdad, but also to interventions by other New regional elections would not be held until 2005; and in a way, an invisible frontier between KDP-and PUK-controlled territory remained in place.
Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003: consolidation or contestation?
Despite these enduring features, a measure of stability was achieved after 1998. Hence, for Iraq Kurdistan, the American-led 2003 war against Saddam Husayn's regime marks far less radical a rupture than for the rest of Iraq: its main political, economic, and even ideological features had stabilized well before the war, and would not meet with major challenges until long after.
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Obviously, the war and its aftermath led to significant political changes, most importantly a steep rise in revenues -17% of Baghdad's oil income being earmarked for the region -and the official recognition of an autonomous Kurdistan region in the 2005 Iraqi constitution; but these changes consolidated and institutionalized existing trends and arrangements rather than marking a radical departure.
Superficially, it might seem as if the post-2003 period merely marks the consolidation of Iraqi
Kurdistan as a recognized sovereign (or at least autonomous) territory within Iraq that is on a steady path way to a well-deserved full independence. Until the 2014 IS offensive, the region also seemed a zone of social peace, political stability, and economic prosperity, as the rest of Iraq descended into (mainly sectarian) violence from late 2005 on. Yet, despite these appearances, the region shows a number of enduring divisions and fault lines; it has hardly stabilized into a power container, but remains a zone of transit, and an arena for conflict. First, the boundaries of the autonomous Kurdistan region remained to be resolved. Second, the persistence and indeed strengthening of patronage undermined the creation of effective institutions, if not the emergence of a sovereign (quasi-) state serving the public good rather than private interests. Third, the enduring or recurring rivalry between the main Iraqi Kurdish parties raises the question of political control over the region. Fourth, cross-border trade continues to display traits of smuggling. Fifth, the presence of Kurds and others from other countries or territories, including expat workers, cultural activists, guerrilla movements (most importantly the PKK), and, especially from 2014, a large influx of refugees and IDPs, shows the continuing importance of transborder movement. Sixth, the presence of foreign troops, most visibly American army forces, but also Turkish and Iranian military personnel, problematizes the region's claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let us explore each of these in turn.
First, the territorial demarcation. After 2003, the area identified as the Kurdistan Region was constitutionally recognized; but it was by no means clearly bounded or delineated. Second, the region continues to be marked by patronage relations, which have had substantial spatial effects. The sudden rise in revenues after 2003 dramatically increased the possibilities for clientelization, but it does not appear to have led to any qualitative changes in existing patterns of party patronage. Currently, the KRG employs a staggering 60% of the region's work force; in fact, government employment seems to be little more than an institutionalized form of patronage. Apparently, all oil revenues were spent immediately, either on public obligations like salary payments or on personal enrichment; no thought whatsoever appears to have been given to building up currency reserves, let alone creating a sovereign wealth fund. 23 The lack of financial transparency in the region greatly increased the opportunities for corruption and
clientelization. An unknown percentage of these funds has flown directly into KDP and PUK party coffers and into the bank accounts of leading politicians; another part has been spent on various forms of patronage. The most visible, and undoubtedly the most blatant, of these is the direct allocation of funds to those close to the power elites. Christians, the Yezidis, the Turcomans and others, appear to be numerically too small and politically and economically too weak to mount a serious challenge. Of these groups, only the Christians are represented as such in the regional parliament. There are indications, however, that the KRG displays an increasingly restrictive notion of Kurdishness, not only towards minorities (members of which have repeatedly complained of being treated as second-class citizens) and towards IDPs coming from elsewhere in Iraq, but also towards Kurds born in or long resident in Baghdad. We will return to this below.
The fourth significant and problematic feature of Iraqi Kurdistan as a political space is the particular character of its cross-border trade. Most importantly, of course, this trade involves the export of crude oil and refined petrol products; but also the import of basic foodstuffs is crucial. The latter became particularly important given the near-total disappearance of a productive agricultural sector in the region: since the 1990s, the region had been nearly completely dependent on imports from neighbouring Turkey and Iran for its basic needs.
Imports from Syria were considerably reduced, though not entirely discontinued, since the outbreak of the civil war.
Also after the ousting of Saddam and the recognition of an autonomous Kurdistan region, the distinction between officially sanctioned exports and illegitimate smuggling remained fluid and politically contested. To begin with, there was little if any governmental transparency nor any independent oversight concerning oil exports and customs levies (and more generally of KRG revenues and expenditures), leaving ample room for corruption. And indeed, there have been reports of individuals with party connections smuggling oil across the borders. Moreover, the Kurdistan region increasingly resorted to, and prepared for, the independent production and export of oil, in apparent anticipation of independence, if not already acting like an independent state. When legally challenged by the Baghdad government concerning these exports, Kurdish producers resorted to selling oil at prices far below the international market rates, to buyers in Turkey, Iran, and, according to some sources, Israel. Given the general lack of transparency surrounding the region's finances, it is quite unclear how much of these oil revenues (or even how much of the 17% of Baghdad's oil revenues officially earmarked for the Kurdistan region) has ended up with the regional government, and how much has fallen in private hands; but one may surmise that the latter part is considerable, witness the large number of non-entrepreneurial millionaires in the region. Given the lack of transparency and the contested character of oil production, the very distinction between legitimate exports and informal or illegitimate smuggling becomes increasingly difficult to make. Put differently: the role of stable state institutions has been at best minor and at worst imaginary. Kurdistan as a self-contained political or economic space with a clearly delimited population.
Until the financial crisis that erupted in 2014, a substantial part of local youths receiving higher education grew up believing they could expect -and, indeed, were entitled to -a secure income through a virtually guaranteed government employment. As a result (at least until the 2014 cut of funds from Baghdad and the IS crisis), the majority of the personnel in the services sector, and in particular in restaurants and shops, were Kurds from Turkey, Syria, and Iran; a significant percentage of managers in the more luxury hotels, restaurants and department stores were Lebanese; and a large part of the personnel at hotels and airports hailed from the Indian subcontinent. Until the IS takeover of Mosul, one could also see day laborers from Mosul province waiting for employers on street corners. Needless to say, these expatriate workers had neither political rights nor political representation.
The transborder flow of personnel was not only of a purely economic character, but also included cultural exchange. Demokrat), a local political party, ideologically close to but officially independent from the PKK, was formed. Initially, it was persecuted by the state; but after the start of the uprising against the Syrian regime, this changed dramatically. In the summer of 2012, the Asad regime suddenly, and without any military confrontation, handed over substantial parts of this area to the PYD. At a single stroke, this party became the sole party locally in power, ending decades of KDP dominance; it quickly proceeded to oust, imprison, and in some cases kill personnel from the other, KDP-backed parties. In short, Kurdish party politics or party rivalries hardly stopped at national boundaries; rather, rivalling parties could use these boundaries as strategic assets.
Sixth and finally, the substantial foreign military presence and the lack of a standing regional army further problematizes any notion that Iraqi Kurdistan is, or could develop into, a fully sovereign state. The region has neither any Iraqi army bases nor a regional conscript army, but, in essence, only salaried party militias. The very persistence of these militias, it seems, reflects a substantial demographic change: an entire generation of youths has come of age without ever having experienced -let alone actively participated in -insurgency and counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare or its violent repression. Instead, they have increasingly come to see security, material well-being and employment as entitlements rather than hard-won achievements. As a result, the Peshmerga forces are basically a professional army, if not a party militia, which counts significant numbers of older men.
Next to this persistence of military party politics, the region contains a substantial presence of Turkish and Iranian army personnel (not to mention the American and other troops and advisers who participate in the war against IS). The numbers of these troops and the extent of their activities are unclear; but the very presence of these forces appears to contradict or undermine Kurdish claims or aspirations to sovereign statehood. Instead, the region appears to be a space or arena where rivalries between various state and non-state actors are enacted, without any side being the obvious or uncontested sovereign or legitimate power.
The 2014 IS offensive and its aftermath: proliferating violence or homogenizing space?
In the summer of 2014, many of these long-standing conflicts boiled over, in the wake of the Makhmur was briefly captured by IS before it was reconquered, apparently by a temporal alliance of Peshmerga forces and PKK guerrillas supported by U.S. air power.
Significantly, these attacks focused on areas that had been contested since 2003. In attacking these areas, the population of which was seen as less than fully loyal to, and/or as less than fully Kurdish by, the KRG, IS appears to have tested the latter's resolve. The role and responsibility of the KRG in these events has never been independently explored, and hence remains the subject of controversy. A substantial number of Sinjari Yezidis feel let down if not betrayed by the Peshmerga forces, and appear to have shifted loyalties to the PKK, the guerrillas of which, they felt, have made a more substantial effort to protect them. Thus, Sinjar region has become not only a space of confrontation between the Kurds and IS, but also an arena for the rivalry between the KDP and the PKK -a rivalry generally pursued by military and economic rather than political or legal means. These rivalries, it should be added, have hardly helped the already severely affected local Yezidi population.
Kurdish reactions to the advances made by IS appear to reflect a keen attention for economic interests. In June 2014, KRG forces took military control over all of oil-rich Kirkuk province, in the wake of the IS offensive against Mosul, and the collapse of the Iraqi army in the North of the country. In July 2014, Kurdish forces captured the Ayn Zalah oil field Northwest of Mosul, after it had been abandoned by Iraqi government troops. 26 The field, which yields an estimated 2,000 barrels per day, reportedly came under the control of KDP strongman Masrour
Barzani, who, according to local sources, kept all revenues as private profit; but these reports have not been officially confirmed.
The offensive and the continuing threat posed by IS did not lead to a closing of ranks among the Iraqi Kurdish parties. On the contrary, in the summer of 2015, the conflict between Goran and the KDP came to a head after a number of violent anti-KDP demonstrations in Sulaimaniya province. KDP officials were quick to blame Goran for the agitation, ousting all Goran members from the cabinet, and refusing Goran representatives any further entrance into Erbil. Initially, the PUK remained neutral in this conflict; but in May 2016, a merger (or, perhaps more correctly, reunion) between the PUK and Goran was achieved. 27 In reaction, the KDP only appears to have dug its heels deeper into the sand. As a result of the political deadlock, the regional parliament has effectively stopped functioning, despite the acute financial crisis, despite the threat posed by IS, and despite the currently ongoing Mosul offensive. There are indications that, in the conflict between KDP and Goran (and, after the May 2016 merger, the PUK-Goran alliance), the Obama administration tacitly sided with Barzani, apparently considering the latter a more stable regional force, and a more reliable ally, in the thenimpending Mosul offensive.
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There is increasing popular disaffection with the region's staggering corruption and pervasive patronage; but this has not, or not yet, translated into any substantial political mobilization.
Indeed, the lack of public protest against the KRG's financial and other failings is surprising; the relative quiet may be due in part to the increasingly oppressive presence of local authorities, and in part to the looming threat of IS. Thus far, the KRG's failure to pay peshmerga salaries on a regular basis has apparently not led to any mass desertion; but the enduring loyalty of the regional forces, let alone the civilian population, cannot even be taken for granted in the face of the IS threat. Among the public, irritation about the government's corruption and mishandling of the current economic and political crisis is growing. Although it is doubtful such disaffection will crystallize into violent organized opposition (radical armed groups being largely absent in the regional political landscape), the KRG is clearly alarmed, as could be seen already in the summer of 2015. Undoubtedly triggered by the August 2015 demonstrations in Baghdad, which had forced the Abadi government to announce major reforms, the KRG took precautions against any public display of discontent, putting riot police and water cannons on alert in the major cities. 29 Given the depth of the cash crisis, it may be surprising that serious or large-scale protests had not already occurred much earlier. One factor is undoubtedly the menacing presence of IS troops nearby, a threat carefully and hitherto successfully exploited by the KRG; another factor appears to be locals resorting to using their own savings, to borrowing (from private individuals rather than institutionalized banks) and to remittances from relatives abroad. Local observers say that more serious protests may be expected when these means are getting exhausted; but as of mid-2017, such protests have hardly occurred on a large scale.
The 2014 IS offensive led to major waves of forced migration and displacement. The wider conflict of which it was the culmination especially worsened the living conditions for people qualified as 'minorities' by whoever was in power locally. In 2016, the Kurdistan Region hosted an estimated 1,6 million refugees and internally displaced persons. Erbil, Duhok, and Koya, November, 2014; August 2015; and May, 2016. 31 http://www.voanews.com/content/minorities-in-iraq-kurdistan-push-for-greater-politicalvoice/2910051.html (accessed September 15, 2015) . and Sinjar by referendum, to be decided by a referendum within two years; but no such referendum was ever held, nor is it likely to be held. The regional constitution stipulated that the region's president could serve a maximum of two terms; but since 2013, the regional parliament, then dominated by KDP and PUK, has twice voted to extend Barzani's mandate. in an apparent attempt either to stop the flow of supplies to PKK and/or PYD guerrillas or to punish the local population for their PKK sympathies. 35 Regardless of the question of whether such embargo policies are effective or justifiable, and regardless of whether they reflect the KRG's or Barzani's own intentions rather than Turkish demands, these seem less the measures of a sovereign power backed by laws than the strategies of one side in a highly contested, and violent, field.
These crises of space and sovereignty have gone largely unnoticed. Attention in the international media has focused on Kurdish participation in the battle against IS, demands for arms supplies and Peshmerga salaries and claims to statehood, rather than on intra-Kurdish rivalries or the ongoing economic, political, and constitutional crises. Indeed, one might suspect that part of the Kurdish leadership is playing the independence card amidst a major multilevel crisis not only as a way of gaining leverage against the Baghdad government, but also as a way of keeping, or regaining, legitimacy among the local population, which is clearly unhappy with the elected structures' lack of functioning. Personal ambition also appears to be a significant factor: indeed, Massoud Barzani has publicly stated his intention to be the regional president to statehood, pledging to resign on the day independence is declared. 36 Opponents argue that such an independent Kurdistan would not be a fully sovereign state but a mere satellite or vassal of Turkey and Iran, and that Barzani's clinging onto office is unconstitutional, especially after the expiring of the two extensions of his mandate (with these extensions themselves already being the result of KDP-PUK backroom dealing rather than constitutional provisions). These discussions, however, appear to have little echo among the region's population at large.
Although the vast majority of the Kurds have long dreamed, and still dream, of independence, the bulk of the population seem currently more preoccupied with making ends meet, and appear sceptical about all talk of independence. In private, many have expressed their frustration with the parties' increasingly authoritarian behaviour, the pervasive corruption, the political deadlock, and the regional government's inability to pay salaries. These and other developments suggest an ongoing attempt to create a more homogeneous Kurdish space. Thus, there are indications that the rump KRG's, or the KDP's, increasingly restrictive definition of political loyalty and Kurdishness is directed not only against political pluralism but also against societal plurality. Whether or not informed by a systematic policy, the exclusion of Goran members from territory it considers its own, and the effective weakening if not disappearance of minorities like Yezidis, Shabak, and Christians, combined with increasingly narrow conceptions of Kurdishness on the part of the regional authorities, has had the joint effect of creating a politically and culturally homogeneous Kurdish-dominated space. 38 Interviews, Yezidi, Shabak, and Assyrian spokespersons, Brussels, July 2015; Erbil, August 2015
